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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

JCS review  
completed.

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11 August 1972  
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.



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### SPECIAL REPORT

(Published separately)

Colombia: Politics in a New Key

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**ALGERIA: ALL IN A QUANDARY**

Twice this summer, aircraft hijackers have forced the Algerian Government to wrestle with a real dilemma: how to keep its revolutionary image untarnished and yet maintain national dignity in the face of international censure. Believing itself to be the vanguard of revolutionary states and mindful that Algerian rebels received sanctuary in various countries before independence in 1962, Algeria offers safe haven to a motley assortment of liberation groups and revolutionary exiles. Also, Algerian officials are extremely sensitive to any intimation of interference in what they regard as their own affairs.

Authorities were still "investigating" the motives of the hijackers who on 2 June had ordered a Western Air Lines Boeing 720 to Algiers, when on 31 July the government was informed of the arrival of a hijacked Delta Airlines DC-8. Both planes were allowed to land as a "humanitarian" gesture, and the planes and their crews were permitted to depart within a few hours. Algerian authorities confiscated the ransom and took the unwelcome guests into custody.

"We chose to come to Algeria because, as students of world revolution, we knew of the Algerian reputation as a revolutionary country and as a friend and firm supporter of oppressed and fighting people everywhere. We are shocked and bewildered...to see our successful revolutionary actions threatened with ultimate defeat by the Algerian Government. We feel that by allowing the plane to land in Algiers, the Algerian Government is not obligated to go one step further and play the part of policemen for the US Government. Therefore, we request...give us back our \$1 million and we will go somewhere else." (Open letter from the Delta Hijackers to Boumedienne, 8 Aug 72)

Although officials declared almost from the outset that the return of the Western Air Lines ransom posed no problem, the actual handing back of the money was delayed by red tape and the lack of diplomatic relations between Algeria and the US. The Algerians complained of a hostile American press and "unacceptable" pressure, especially in international forums and from airline pilots' organizations. It was 25 days after the plane's arrival before the head of Algeria's nationalized airlines turned over the half million exacted on 2 June. The Algerians have indicated that a similar disposition will be made of Delta's \$1 million, but they have been unwilling to set a date for its return.

The fate of the hijackers poses a more complicated problem. Algiers adheres to the Chicago civil air convention, but is not a signatory to the 1970 Hague Convention on Hijacking that requires extradition or prosecution of hijackers. Some elements within the Algerian bureaucracy favor the granting of political asylum; a few even want to keep the ransom money. Prime Minister Boumedienne, however, [redacted] ordered that the ransom be returned and that under no circumstances were the Delta Airlines hijackers to be considered political exiles or allowed a political forum, but that asylum might be granted on "compassionate grounds."

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US officials in Algiers report that there is considerable disenchantment with hijackers among government officials. While considering themselves honor-bound to aid revolutionaries, they regard the exaction of ransom, the smoking of marijuana, and the involvement of children—three accompanied the Delta hijackers—as "be-smirching impurities" to a genuine revolutionary movement. At present, the government remains unwilling to prosecute or extradite hijackers, which would seem to be a more effective deterrent to would-be hijackers. [redacted]

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**SECRET****VIETNAM: NEW OFFENSIVE SHAPING UP**

There are signs that Communist main-force units may try to initiate a substantial and coordinated offensive in several areas of South Vietnam, perhaps within the next few weeks. Although the attacks probably will not be on the scale of the Communist thrusts in early spring, Hanoi will be hoping to secure battlefield gains that will have an influence on domestic politics in the US and strengthen their bargaining hand at Paris.

August and September would be important months because US election fervor would be rising.

The recent deployment of almost two additional enemy infantry divisions from North Vietnam into northern Military Region (MR) 1 and the steady, additional movement of enemy units into the northern delta, suggest that these two areas will be the focal points of the campaign. Renewed assaults around An Loc and in the provinces northwest of Saigon also appear in prospect, along with a substantial step-up in enemy operations in sectors of the central coast. In the western highlands, however, where the Communists laid siege to Kontum this spring, substantial new attacks do not seem at hand.

**The Quang Tri - Hue Front**

The movement of two additional North Vietnamese divisions—the 312th and 325th—into northern South Vietnam to augment four enemy divisions already there began in mid-July, shortly after the South Vietnamese counter-offensive into Quang Tri Province. There had been earlier indications that the North Vietnamese were planning to commit two divisions to the northern front. The South Vietnamese counter-offensive appears to have forced Hanoi's hand. The current locations

suggests that the North Vietnamese plan to use them in a vigorous counterpunch at the South Vietnamese units strung out along Route 1 to Quang Tri City, hoping to cut off and defeat these government troops, some of Saigon's best.

So far, there has been little evidence that the Communists are augmenting their infantry force to the west of Hue, an action the enemy would presumably consider necessary if a full-scale attack on the city were planned for the near future. The Communists have recently stepped up their attacks against government positions west of Hue, where two government fire support bases have changed hands several times within the past month. Enemy gunners are within artillery range of the old imperial capital, and it appears that the Communists would like to push back the South Vietnamese 1st Division.

A similar enemy strategy may be used in Quang Nam Province to the south, where another division-sized enemy force—the 711th Division—is pressing from the west against government outposts and district strongpoints in Que Son and Duc Duc districts. The Communists probably intend to stretch government resources as thin as possible. Earlier in the offensive, the Communists employed a similar strategy in Quang Nam Province to back their operations to the north. The North Vietnamese may hope that increased attacks in Quang Nam Province will keep South Vietnamese units there from reinforcing the northern battlefield should the fighting begin to turn against the government there.

**The Delta and the Saigon Area**

The Communists have massed the largest concentration of main-force units ever seen in the northern delta. At least five infantry regiments

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and [ ] an artillery regiment already are there, and possibly two more infantry regiments are on the way. Most of the infiltrating units, including some of the enemy's 5th Division, have been heading for a base camp in the northwestern tri-border area of Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, and Kien Phong provinces. [ ]

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In moving substantial forces into this area, the Communists appear to have several objectives in mind. It is a long-time Communist stronghold which lies close to Route 4, the government's main road link to the delta, and to a variety of canals over which food is moved to Saigon. If the Communists could regularly interdict the road and water routes through the area for an extended period, they would seriously disrupt the government's ability to support its forces in the southern delta, and thus facilitate additional gains by their own units. The base area also provides a favorable position for attacks around and on My Tho, a strategic provincial capital.

[ ] to date there are few indications that the Communists are moving additional main-force units into these provinces. They would need more manpower to mount a telling offensive there. Most enemy forces involved in the heavy fighting earlier have recently seen only limited action. Most of the units from the Communist 7th and 9th divisions probably are still in the An Loc area. It seems likely that these units would again be used in Binh Long or Binh Duong provinces in the hope of preventing Saigon from diverting additional forces to the north or reinforcing threatened units elsewhere.

### Central Vietnam

Present main-force dispositions suggest that enemy activity in the western highlands will not increase substantially in the coming weeks. Many of the big North Vietnamese units previously engaged in the fighting in Kontum and Pleiku provinces have moved out of the area. On the coast, however, stiff resistance to government efforts to recapture areas in northern Binh Dinh Province suggest that fairly hard fighting lies ahead. [ ]

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### Prospects

The renewed Communist offensive is likely to be smaller and more selective than the thrusts in April and May. With the heavy rains and flooding in some areas, resupply difficulties may limit Communist abilities to sustain a heavy pace of fighting. Combat this spring reduced the strength and fighting ability of many enemy units. The newly trained troops that Hanoi sent south probably have offset troop losses, but even after refitting, the performance of these units will suffer from the loss of experienced leadership cadre and specialists.

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Despite such limitations, the Communists apparently believe that heavy action in the coming weeks offers a possibility of at least limited tactical gains as well as significant political impact. Some evidence of the scope of enemy plans is appearing in current North Vietnamese propaganda on the war. Hanoi's Defense Minister Giap recently claimed that "favorable opportunities" now exist in the South to push forward on the battlefields. Radio and press commentaries are emphasizing both Quang Tri and the delta as theaters of operation. [ ]

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## INDOCHINA

## STALEMATE AT QUANG TRI

The battle for Quang Tri City is well into its second month and the situation remains deadlocked. Both sides are displaying determination to accomplish their objectives—the South Vietnamese to move forward and the North Vietnamese to stay in place. Despite support from B-52s, tactical air strikes, naval gunfire, and heavy South Vietnamese artillery fire, government ground forces have been unable to retake all of the provincial capital and move westward into Communist-held territory.

The Communists have committed a substantial number of their reserve forces to the Quang Tri battlefield. They have managed to keep resupply channels open enough to reinforce and rotate battered fighting units and enable their heavy artillery to fire upwards of 1,000 rounds per day at South Vietnamese positions in and around the city. Although some Communist problems have come to light, most of the available information shows no let-up in enemy determination to keep the South Vietnamese from taking back Quang Tri.

On the government side, time may run out if current goals are not achieved soon. South Vietnamese airborne units fought hard in Quang Tri City for three weeks. They were relieved by marines who have been involved in similar heavy fighting for nearly two weeks and have not yet advanced much beyond where the paratroopers were. Not only are the Communists well dug in against ground assaults, but the intensity and accuracy of their artillery fire has made government progress difficult. One South Vietnamese officer recently commented to a newsmen that his troops would not be able to clear the city until the enemy's large artillery pieces were silenced.

## Signs of New Enemy Action

In addition to the fighting in Quang Tri City during the week, Communist attacks in widespread sectors of South Vietnam may be the



US Navy

North Vietnamese Artillery

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
preliminary stages of the new phase of enemy action expected in the coming weeks. A tank-led enemy force overran a South Vietnamese Ranger unit in Quang Tri Province early in the week and similar attacks are expected against airborne units operating west of Route 1. Near Hue, Communist local forces teamed up with main-force units to test the southern defenses of the city with a series of assaults on hamlets. South Vietnamese territorial forces forced the enemy to pull back, but the attack generated new government concern about possible attacks on Hue from the south.

Communist military action in the southern provinces of Military Region 1 has been sputtering along for some time, but stepped-up action this week has been of the kind that normally precedes larger attacks. Communist forces increased their shelling and ground attacks against small towns and remote government bases in both

Kontum and Pleiku provinces during the week. Local force attacks also picked up in coastal Phu Yen Province, [redacted] the North Vietnamese 3rd Division in northern Binh Dinh Province suggest preparations for more vigorous opposition to the South Vietnamese counter-offensive there.

Parts of a North Vietnamese infantry regiment and a rocket regiment moved closer to Saigon and in mid-week launched a series of attacks some 17 miles east of the capital. A communications facility at Nui Ba Den in Tay Ninh Province has been the target of enemy attacks during the week and renewed action in Binh Long Province may signify that elements of the Communists 7th and 9th divisions are becoming more active again.

The movement of enemy units out of Base Area 470 toward potential targets suggests that



USS Badger's five-inch guns in action off Quang Tri.

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the anticipated enemy drive in the northern delta may have begun. With the continuing realignment of South Vietnamese forces within the delta provinces and with the refitting of one government division still incomplete, enemy units elsewhere in the delta may also try to exploit the situation.

#### **HANOI DISCUSSES THE OFFENSIVE**

An authoritative North Vietnamese military commentator has published a progress report on the offensive that tends to water down Hanoi's earlier claims of success. The author, writing

under the pseudonym "Chien Binh" (Combatant), couches his commentary in optimistic rhetoric, but his analysis of specific military operations in effect contradicts the bombast. For the first time, North Vietnamese readers are told in unequivocal terms that the South Vietnamese still hold Hue, An Loc, and Kontum City. The author has to strain to portray South Vietnamese operations in these areas as weak, emphasizing the heavy loss of life and heavy US air cover. He also seems hard-put to minimize the importance and impact of US air strikes on North Vietnam, saying only that if the allies were winning, they would not have to resort to such tactics.

The author makes an unequivocal claim of Communist military success only for Binh Dinh Province. He offers no judgment on the situation in Quang Tri, except to suggest that South Vietnam's Army is bogged down there. His final projection is carefully hedged to leave open various strategic options and bears a striking resemblance to the pronouncements on protracted war that the Communists offered prior to the offensive. "Our southern forces are struggling to gain time," he says, "in order to annihilate gradually or weaken the enemy's forces, smash his pacification plan, develop our forces, and organize a firm battleground so as to change the war situation and win increasingly greater victories."

Chien Binh's article may be intended in part as a response to rumors in the party and army that the offensive has encountered difficulties. By taking a modest line on some developments in the South, the author may be hoping to heighten the credibility of the regime's over-all claims of success and to steel the population for another round.

Chien Binh has long advocated the kind of main-force warfare exemplified by the offensive. He was one of the first commentators to tout alleged Communist successes against allied operations in Laos last year as proof of the effectiveness of Communist main forces, and again last April he justified reliance on conventional warfare as the Communist offensive got under way. The appearance of another of his articles at this time is undoubtedly calculated to reassure the people that his line is still practical and effective.

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### Harmony the Hard Way

Last week, President Thieu fired former defense minister Vy for involvement in a savings-fund scandal and issued a new decree aimed at limiting the number of newspapers and periodicals published in Saigon. He reportedly is considering tougher legal requirements for the formation of political parties.

Thieu's dismissal of Vy was the culmination of a lengthy investigation into the misuse of funds collected from soldiers to supplement their incomes as veterans. Although most of the money was invested in banking, lending, and agricultural institutions, Vy and several of his associates were accused of funneling some of the funds into their own pockets. The removal of Vy is an attempt both to placate critics within the military and to strengthen Vice President Huong's anti-corruption drive in the government. While the action against the accused is not harsh, it does serve notice that the more blatant misuses of public funds will no longer be tolerated.

The President's announcement that Saigon's 50-odd daily and weekly publications will now have to pay "insurance deposits" for potential government censure is designed to reduce the number of newspapers and periodicals and to silence speculation about a possible end to the fighting and a cease-fire. While many smaller papers and periodicals may now try to merge in order to raise the money to continue publication, all but about six or seven papers—mostly pro-government—are likely to be eventually forced off the streets.

Thieu may also be planning to cut down the number of political parties by requiring larger party membership and a broader organizational base for registration. Only a few of the existing parties would qualify if he follows through. This, in turn, would help the Democracy Party, which Thieu has been organizing for the past year, to emerge as the country's dominant political force.



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**HOME FLOODING IN THE NORTH**

25X1 A small, frequently flooded area in North Vietnam's Red River delta is under water, according to aerial photography [redacted] Several breaches are evident in one section of the dike at this point, and water is flowing over a number of other sections. Although a bomb crater is visible in one dike in the vicinity, none of the breaches is near the crater. It seems likely that the new breaks were caused at least partly by undermining that dates from last year's disastrous floods.

**BLOCKING ACTION IN NORTH LAOS**


The government's rainy season efforts to reoccupy the hills southwest of the Plaine des Jarres met another rebuff last week. On 6 August, a North Vietnamese battalion forced the irregulars to abandon several positions near Tha Tam Bleung, and they are now regrouping to the west. US pilots and government ground troops this week reported signs of at least two tanks near Tha

Tam Bleung. The North Vietnamese have not used tracked vehicles since April, when they attacked the big government base at Long Tieng.

**Flurry in the Central Panhandle**

In their first significant initiative in central Laos in several months, Communist troops on 2 August drove Lao Army security units from several villages on Route 9 about ten miles east of the important government military training center of Seno. A mixed Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese force held the villages for three days and then withdrew on 5 August.

It seems unlikely that the activity last week portends a major rainy season thrust west from Dong Hene to occupy new territory. The Communists, however, may be planning harassing attacks—possibly against Seno itself—to forestall government attempts to retake Dong Hene and force the government to think twice before sending any additional irregular forces from central Laos to other parts of the country.



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**CAMBODIA: MILITARY PRESSURE**

The government's month-old campaign to reopen Route 1 has suffered a set-back near the town of Kompong Trabek, which had been re-occupied in late July. Supported by tanks, enemy troops on 6 August launched a series of attacks against five government battalions holding the town. The Communists pressed the attack in the face of heavy US air strikes and by midweek had forced the defenders to withdraw to positions west of the town.


This was the first Communist use of armor in the Cambodian conflict. Several North Vietnamese prisoners have claimed that 18 tanks were sent from the Communist-controlled Chup plantation in Kompong Cham Province to take part in the attack on Kompong Trabek. Initial reports indicated that US air strikes may have destroyed or damaged as many as 17 tanks.

Phnom Penh, meanwhile, has sent reinforcements to its staging base at Neak Luong in

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preparation for another push on Kompong Trabek. The Cambodians have also asked the South Vietnamese for fresh assistance.

The Communist action near Kompong Trabek is most likely designed to prevent the Cambodians and South Vietnamese from moving farther eastward along Route 1 toward the isolated town of Svay Rieng. Such an advance would jeopardize vital enemy supply lines running into South Vietnam's delta.

#### Election Boycotts

In addition to these military difficulties, the Lon Nol government was dealt a political rebuff when the country's two leading opposition groups—the Republican and Democratic parties—announced that they would not participate in the National Assembly elections on 3 September. Both parties quit with strong attacks on the fairness of the electoral law, which clearly favors the government.

With the withdrawal of the Republicans and the Democrats, the field is now clear for the pro-Lon Nol Socio-Republican Party to obtain a commanding majority in the assembly. It is possible, however, that President Lon Nol may yet decide to postpone the election—which now looms as a hollow political event. A postponement of the elections would further complicate and delay the nomination of a vice president, an appointment that requires approval of the assembly.

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## THAILAND: PING-PONG AGAIN

Bangkok is taking a major step toward improving relations with Peking. General Praphat, deputy chairman of the ruling National Executive Council, announced last week that a Thai ping-pong team would go to China to participate in matches conducted under the auspices of the Chinese-backed Asian Table Tennis Association. Praphat had said as recently as last month that Bangkok would not send a team because the invitation had not come directly from the Chinese.

Praphat may have conceded the point in order to use the ping-pong visit to discuss substantive matters. The Thai delegation will include Prasit Kanchanawat, a senior economic official who is a close associate of Praphat. The Bangkok press is reporting that Prasit will discuss the possibility of opening commercial relations between the two countries and will meet with Premier Chou En-lai. Although Praphat attempted, in a conversation with the US ambassador, to down-

play Thai intentions by saying that Prasit will not take the initiative with the Chinese, it is likely that the Thai will seize any opportunity for substantive talks.

The decision to send Prasit and the ping-pong team to China is a major turning point in the process of redirecting Bangkok's policy toward Peking inaugurated by former foreign minister Thanat in 1968. The wavering and even erratic nature of Bangkok's movement toward better relations is in part a result of differences within the leadership [redacted]

[redacted] It also reflects the difficulty the Thai have had in reconciling what they perceive to be the increased need for establishing contacts with China with their long-standing fears about China's intentions toward Thailand, as well as the impact that contacts will have on the large Chinese community in Thailand. [redacted]

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"Workers of the Shanghai ping-pong ball factory have produced a large quantity of 'Red Double-Happiness' brand ping-pong balls for the...friendly invitational table-tennis tournament."

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## TAIWAN: A HEALTHY ECONOMY

The Taiwanese economy maintained its vigorous growth during the first half of this year despite recent diplomatic setbacks. Thus far, loss of diplomatic relations has not impeded the expansion of commercial ties overseas as Taipei has managed to maintain trade representation in many countries that have recognized Peking. The devaluation of Taiwan's currency along with the US dollar last December has increased the competitiveness of products in world markets.

Among the impressive gains in the first half year was a 38-percent increase in exports above the corresponding 1971 period; industrial output rose by more than 27 percent. The strong performance of these key sectors shows no sign of let-up, and real economic growth in 1972 is likely to reach last year's near-record 11 percent.

This hearty growth continues to be sparked by the dynamic increase in exports of light manufactures, such as textiles, clothing, and electrical and electronic items. The nearly \$1.4 billion in exports during the six months yielded a small trade surplus of \$36 million. Total bilateral trade with the US and Japan, Taiwan's major trading partners, rose 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively, over the first six months of last year. Increased sales to Western Europe, Latin America, and Canada were also recorded, partly as a result of the trade offensive Taipei initiated late last year to boost and diversify exports.

Despite the political uncertainties, the overall outlook is favorable for foreign investment, an important element in the growth of Taiwan's exports and the economy as a whole. Although some US investors are delaying new spending and the Japanese have scrapped practically all new proposals, Europeans and overseas Chinese have stepped up their investment activities. The foreign business community in Taiwan, attracted by Taiwan's low-cost, hard-working labor force and favorable tax benefits, continues optimistic about



the country's economic future. The Japanese, with few exceptions, are not withdrawing their existing investments in Taiwan. Despite the caution of parent firms, a number of expansion plans are proceeding, and three major US banks will open branches in Taiwan this year.

Prospective foreign investments approved by Taipei so far this year are running only slightly behind last year's record level, and actual foreign investment in plant and equipment for the full year may be the largest to date. 25X1

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**SECRET****ZAIRE: MOBUTU AND HIS ARMY**

President Mobutu Sese Seko has completed the most far-reaching shake-up of the army high command since he took power in 1965. Having retired nine of the army's 16 generals with full honors, he has thoroughly reshuffled the remaining senior officers and made significant changes in the command structure. In the process he has sloughed off his oldest cronies, but the new line-up appears carefully calculated to give him leverage over the younger, more effective men assuming key commands.

The personnel sweep resolves several chronic problems that were raising doubts about Mobutu's mastery of the army, the vital base of his power.

This situation had aroused speculation that he could not install a new commander without upsetting the delicate factional balance in the officer corps. The lack of a strong army leader in turn stimulated feuding among second-echelon officers that often came to light during Mobutu's extended international junkets.

The sharpest clashes occurred between Brigadier General Bumba, the flamboyant paratroop commander, and General Nkulufa, the senior officer at the Defense Ministry, who doggedly resisted Bumba's efforts to increase the autonomy of the elite airborne division. The paratroopers are Mobutu's first line of defense against mutinies or riots, and Bumba is from Mobutu's tribe. Bumba is now the army commander and his erstwhile opponent has been shipped to a diplomatic post.

Bumba's promotion over the heads of two major generals could provoke serious resentment. Some of the other personnel shifts suggest that Mobutu has simply kicked Bumba upstairs.

three general officers who are close to the President will take over important commands in eastern Zaire and in the Kinshasa urban area.

Following these changes, it was announced that the army's six gendarme battalions and the

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Mobutu Meets with the High Command

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civil police are merging to form a unified national gendarmerie responsible for all local law enforcement throughout Zaire.

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Another important change may also counter-balance Bumba. Mobutu has created a special presidential staff to include one senior officer each from the army's ground and air components, from the national gendarmerie, and from the coast guard. The chief of the new staff, Colonel Babia, is a highly effective officer who apparently has gained Mobutu's confidence. Mobutu is expected to rely more and more on this staff for a tight control over the army's tactical units.

On the political front, Prime Minister Melen appears to have established good rapport with both military and key civilian leaders. He stands a chance of leading the country through the transition period that will culminate in parliamentary elections in October 1973. Before parliament adjourned in July, it passed a controversial bill beginning land reforms. More detailed land-reform measures will face sharp opposition when introduced this fall into the largely conservative legislature. Parliament reconvenes on 11 September.

#### **TURKEY: A CLEAN SWEEP**

The military leadership is engrossed in its annual game of musical chairs. This year, the stakes are especially high: General Tagmac, chief of the General Staff, reaches retirement age in early September and seems determined to retire completely from public life.

Meanwhile, the security situation has been generally calm for the past six weeks, although isolated incidents are continuing. Sabotage is strongly suspected in the recent damage to one of the approaches to the Bosphorus bridge which is due for completion late next year. An alleged "urban terrorist sabotage gang" was also charged this week with burning the Istanbul Opera House and sinking a Turkish passenger liner some months ago.

The sentiment in top government circles favors a complete change in the military high command. President Sunay appears to favor a clean sweep of the top command, as do the top political leaders.

Turkish revolutionaries reportedly are having some success in rural areas as well as among students and the urban upper class. The Turkish National Security Council, in early July, ordered a purge from government offices of all persons who are "questionable from a security point of view." Martial law, which has been in effect in 11 of Turkey's 67 provinces for the past 16 months, has been extended until 26 September and probably will be extended beyond that.

In any case, military influence on Turkish politics is sure to remain strong.

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Rounding Up Demonstrators in Karachi

## PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE AND VIRULENCE

Both the level of violence and the shrillness of political rhetoric are rising. President Bhutto's dominant position is not yet threatened, but the discord, if it continues, could well lead to repressive measures, which in turn could serve as a catalyst for more violence.

The language riots in Karachi last month were only the most publicized example of the problem. There have been sporadic bombings and other attacks, including a grenade attempt on the life of an extremist leader in Sind Province and an armed assault by Bhutto's followers on an opposition meeting in Lahore.

The opposition has become more vituperative and personal in its verbal assaults on government figures. Bhutto has been called a liar, a murderer, a tyrant, and a traitor. One opposition leader claims to have 53 women ready to testify that the governor of the Punjab is unfit to hold office. Government officials have been replying in kind, often linking their opponents to foreign or big business conspirators.

In the Punjab provincial assembly, disruptive opposition tactics—including an attempt to declare one government supporter insane—forced an early adjournment despite the overwhelming majority enjoyed by Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. The opposition could resort to the same sort of tactics when the National Assembly begins deliberations in Islamabad on 15 August.

One side effect of the domestic turmoil was the decision announced by Bhutto on 10 August that Islamabad would not recognize Bangladesh. Late last month, it appeared that the President wanted the National Assembly to vote favorably on recognition shortly after it convenes. Moreover, Bhutto is aware that only by recognizing Bangladesh can he entice Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman to meet to discuss the future of Pakistani prisoners of war—an issue with emotional impact in Pakistan. Right-wing opposition parties had already begun to agitate against recognition, however, and Bhutto decided against furnishing his opponents with still another issue.

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**SECRET****CHILE: ALLENDE STUMBLES**

The Allende government's winter offensive began to crumble this week under pressures from internal squabbles, political embarrassments, and opposition challenges. Most of the pressures developed from irresponsible acts of his officials or supporters which lent themselves to extensive attack by the opposition. Despite these reverses, Allende continued to push his economic programs.

The parties of Popular Unity demonstrated their lack of unity over a "Peoples' Assembly" in Concepcion. The extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left joined with the Socialists in staging the assembly. The Communists did not participate, and Allende denounced it as reckless and premature, setting off still more disputation within the governing coalition about where it is going and how fast. The arrest of a number of Socialist Party members who were active in a commando unit that had drifted into common banditry proved to be a serious embarrassment for that party, and the identification of the group's leader as a former Nazi assassin with close ties to the Allende family added to the government's woes.

That was not all. Civilian police bungled the arrest of a suspected member of the unit. A raid on a slum outside of Santiago designed to nab the suspect led to a gunfight between the police and the slum militia, leaving one resident dead and several wounded on both sides. The use of violence against the poor is a very touchy point for Allende, and the two top police officials, a Socialist and a Communist, were suspended. The President met with representatives of the shanty town for several hours in the presidential palace, and visited both the police and the slum residents. He was received rather coldly in the slum, and the determination of the slum leaders to prosecute the offending policemen for murder will do nothing to cool tempers.

This debacle came on the heels of other incidents, such as the attack on a bus driver and the murder of a passenger by government officials following a minor traffic accident. While the government was trying to disown the offenders, an opposition senator treated Congress to what he alleged was a recording of a telephone conversation in which the now-suspended police chief and the triggerman arranged for a cover-up. With all these gaffs available, the opposition had no need of new issues and took advantage of every opening.

While these matters were grabbing the headlines, the government was pressing forward with its economic policies. The escudo was sharply devalued. New tax measures doubled prices on some luxury goods. A tax reform is being drawn up to close tax loopholes for high-income citizens. The take-over of industrial firms continues, the Santiago Gas Company being the latest victim. Price controls drove some food retailers to strike, making already scarce meat and its substitutes unavailable to many customers. The government promised a wage increase in October to compensate for price increases falling on workers, and threw in a sizable cash bonus to be paid before Chile's national holiday in September.

The Allende government still holds most of the cards. But it is showing an increasing tendency to stumble while the opposition is showing considerable skill in capitalizing on Allende's missteps. Both sides understand that the daily sparring in the political arena is less important in the long run than the government's economic reforms. While these have yet to be fully explained or implemented, they will play a major role in determining the political future of both government and opposition.

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**SECRET****BRAZIL: QUESTIONS ON TRADE**

The Medici government is facing a dilemma in its foreign trade policy, specifically with regard to Africa. Kenya's foreign minister, en route to a meeting of non-aligned nations in Guyana, stopped off in Brazil to solicit support for the independence of Portugal's African provinces. The Africans probably believe that Brazil, by virtue of its special relationship with Portugal, is in a unique position to help.

By exerting pressure on Portugal, Brazil could probably further its desire to assert leadership over the so-called third world nations. From the economic point of view, however, the drive for industrialization and the search for export markets dictate a close relationship with Europe, which could absorb far more Brazilian products than could black African and other less-developed countries. The Brazilians recognize that trade relations with Europe could be facilitated by close ties with Portugal, particularly if Portugal should join the Common Market.

The Finance Ministry for some time has been advocating a policy of cultivating Portugal's colonies and Africa's white-dominated nations, while the Foreign Ministry has argued that Brazil should concentrate on the black nations of Africa. In fact, Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza is to travel to eight black African nations later this year to seek trade opportunities and to enlist support for Brazil in international bodies like the UN.

If it becomes necessary to choose between pursuing some vague leadership of third world nations and seeking solid economic relationships with potential purchasers of Brazilian products, the pragmatic Brazilians are quite likely to allow the Finance Ministry to prevail.

**BOLIVIA: PLOTTING AND POLITICKING**

President Banzer's government has weathered another round of plotting and political

tensions. Nevertheless, after nearly a year in power, the strains in his coalition are real, and he will have to be careful in balancing the interests of his disparate supporters.

Problems began two weeks ago when the chief of the army engineers criticized Victor Paz Estenssoro, leader of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, one of the two political parties participating with the military in Banzer's coalition. The threat that Paz' party might leave the government was averted when the high command

**Banzer Speaks**

publicly disavowed the engineering chief's statement and expressed full support for the coalition government. In an attempt to improve relations with the military, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement removed one of its vice presidents who had been critical both of the military and of Banzer's government.

While Banzer has been dealing with these problems, rumblings of military discontent have been heard [redacted] In

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part, these sentiments may be traced to the general distrust in the armed forces of civilian politicians.

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These political tensions may have caused Banzer to postpone the cabinet changes that usually take place around Independence Day celebrations on 6 August. In his speech on the occasion, he called for national unity and stressed the political, economic, and social problems that had faced Bolivia when he took power. Another opportunity for announcing adjustments in his cabinet will occur around 19 August, on the first anniversary of the coup that brought him to power.


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### GUYANA HOSTS THE NON-ALIGNED

Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana opened the conference of foreign ministers of non-aligned nations on 8 August. The four-day conference hopes to lay the groundwork for a summit meeting in 1973 or 1974, similar to the one held in 1970 in Zambia. The 27 foreign ministers and 30 representatives of other governments meeting in Georgetown, however, have their work cut out for them.

As one delegate aptly put it: "We realize that things are not the same as they were when we met at Lusaka two years ago. No one would have thought then that it would be possible that President Nixon would be visiting the Chinese or that America and Russia would agree on strategic arms limitation."

In this situation, the central issue the delegates will have to face is redefining the concept of non-alignment. In his opening speech, Prime Minister Burnham defined it as "the desire, determination, and aspiration of poor nations to rely primarily on their own efforts to achieve economic independence...and not to be pushed around." The Cubans have generally defined it as



Conference Symbol

the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, and other delegates doubtless have their own ideas.

Such philosophical problems and a number of procedural questions must be settled before the delegates can determine if they still have a common role to play in world politics. Non-alignment in the form evolved during the 1950s and 1960s has lost its momentum and is foundering in a sea of changing relationships among the major powers.

Still, Burnham attaches great importance to the success of the conference. He has made a concerted effort to have it appear successful. He has provided an ostentatious new car to each delegation head. Georgetown, normally shabby and drab, has been spruced up considerably. Buildings and fences have been painted, new street lights installed, and principal thoroughfares decorated with flags, banners, and bunting. He probably believes that as long as rancorous public divisions can be avoided, it will have been profitable for him and for Guyana.

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
## VENEZUELA: OIL TALKS COULD START

The climate is improving for some forward movement toward a comprehensive US-Venezuelan petroleum agreement. The director of Venezuela's Office of Petroleum Economics, Ramsey Michelena, has expressed this view, and indeed there are signs of an upturn in the Caldera government's relations, both with the US Government and with the US oil companies.

A key to the improved possibilities for a mutually advantageous deal is a recent confidential agreement between the ruling Christian Democrats and the major opposition Democratic Action Party. President Caldera and former president Betancourt reportedly have agreed that their parties will work together on petroleum issues during the period leading up to the December 1973 elections and will try to keep petroleum out of bounds as a partisan campaign issue. This understanding also gets around what the oil company officials have called a major barrier to their potential investment: the danger that any agreement reached with the present government will not be honored by the next.

Michelena indicated some differences within the government about developing the country's oil reserves. Minister of Mines Perez La Salvia, for example, claims that the government and its own petroleum company can finance such development itself, but wants to defer a decision until after the elections. Others in the administration, however, are coming to realize that revenue needs can be met only by increased production and favor moving ahead now to develop reserves with foreign capital.

Another encouraging sign is recent friendly gestures between Caldera and Standard of New Jersey's subsidiary, Creole Petroleum Company, the largest oil firm in the country and a symbol to Venezuelans of foreign economic domination. Caldera personally attended the inauguration of a new Creole distilling plant two weeks ago and



invited the head of the company to travel in the presidential plane. Creole officials have been expressing their confidence in a useful and profitable future in Venezuela.

Although it will be difficult for the Venezuelans to avoid partisan backbiting on oil issues as the campaigning becomes intense, there are compelling reasons for the kind of restraint the two major parties have vowed. A long-range commitment to a favorable atmosphere for investors seems the surest, if not the only, way to get the capital for further development of Venezuelan oil.

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**PANAMA: A SEAL OF APPROVAL**

Strong man Omar Torrijos easily put the Panamanian public through the first of a series of steps designed to confer legitimacy on his government. The full results of the balloting on 6 August are not to be revealed until this weekend, but there was little difference between candidates for the 505-member national legislature that will be created by the voting. The election was run without political parties, issues, or opposition, and merely sets up a group to select a figurehead president and vice president and to approve a new constitution. The new constitution could empower the legislature to continue in session after these tasks are accomplished but, as of the moment, the group's tenure remains unclear. So does the date of its inaugural session. The original election decree set the first meeting 15 days after the announcement of the results, but General Torrijos now is saying that the assembly will meet between 11 October and 11 November.


The constitution is not yet ready for the legislature, and agreement on the draft is not coming easily. Last week Torrijos held a series of meetings with representatives of key elements of Panamanian society to discuss the recommendations of his Constitutional Reform Commission. According to one report, the discussions went badly. Further consultations appear necessary before the document is released in final form.

Meanwhile, the government media are trumpeting the honesty with which the elections were conducted and the high rate—95 percent—of participation. The regime had ensured the heavy turnout by easing voting requirements and by announcing that a voting certificate will be necessary in the future in such matters as obtaining drivers' licenses and paying taxes without a penalty. Thus, the first step toward institutionalizing the Torrijos revolution of 11 October 1968 was taken in orderly and smooth fashion.

**ECUADOR TO BEGIN OIL EXPORTS**

Crude oil from the Oriente oil fields is now filling storage tanks at Esmeraldas, the port at the western terminal of the newly completed 318-mile trans-Ecuadorian pipeline. Exports are slated to begin later this month when the loading facility becomes operational. Next year, when the pipeline reaches full capacity of 250,000 barrels per day, Ecuador will emerge as Latin America's largest petroleum exporter after Venezuela.

The pipeline was constructed by Texaco-Gulf at a cost of \$154 million, which represents half of their total investment in developing their 1.2 million-acre concession. The companies have enjoyed spectacular success in drilling operations in the northeastern jungles, and proved reserves now total 5-6 billion barrels. This figure could increase significantly as drilling by other companies proceeds in neighboring areas.

**Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline**

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Under the tentative financial arrangements carried over from the former government, revenues from petroleum are slated to reach some \$100 million in 1973, the first full year of crude exports. This would represent some three fifths of total 1971 revenues and would permit a balanced budget even with substantially increased public expenditures. Moreover, net foreign-exchange earnings from petroleum exports would total \$130 million, equal to more than half of all export earnings in 1971.

How much Ecuador will eventually gain from its oil boom, however, will depend on the petroleum policy established by the new military government. With the pipeline now completed, the government has moved to increase its financial take and gain more control over the industry's operations. It has retroactively applied the very restrictive 1971 Hydrocarbons Law to all oil-exploration contracts and has established tax-reference prices as well as a system for the surrender of foreign-exchange earnings from petroleum exports.


Although Texaco-Gulf indicate that they probably can live with these regulations, many of the companies still engaged in exploratory drilling are concerned that they will be unable to operate under the prevailing tax structure and the provisions for reversion of acreage. Some of the companies that have been considerably less successful than Texaco-Gulf in oil exploration may relinquish their concessions in the face of higher production costs and uncertainty over the government's petroleum policy.

The government recognizes the need for foreign capital to develop the oil industry, and oil revenues are being counted on to ease Ecuador's chronic economic problems. At the same time, however, the government wishes to maintain its nationalist credentials, and the foreign oil companies are the most visible target. Company representatives are hopeful that a mutually satisfactory agreement will emerge as Ecuadorian officials gain practical experience in oil matters. Both sides face a period of hard bargaining, but in recent negotiations the government has proved fairly responsive to the position of Texaco-Gulf.

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## EUROPEAN SPACE PROBLEMS

European and American representatives over the next few weeks will attempt to preserve the possibility of European participation in the US post-Apollo space program. The main problems are—as they have been for several years—sharp divisions among the Europeans over the direction of their space expenditures, the lack of an effective European space organization, and European reservations that they will gain much in the way of useful new technology by participating in a US program. These are huge problems to be cleared up by October, when a final decision whether to participate must be given.

The Europeans originally were to meet to reach a decision on post-Apollo in mid-July. The meeting of the European Space Conference was postponed, in part, because of shifting definitions of the possible European role by the US. Another reason for the postponement was the French desire to give priority to the construction of a European launcher—the Europa III. Despite the costly failures in the Europa I and II programs, Paris insists on Europe's need for an independent launch capability. The French stress the "inadequacy" of US guarantees to provide launchers. They argue that an independent launcher is the only way to assure a European launch capability, particularly for future European communications satellites.


The difficulty the Europeans are having in deciding on a course of action has been aggravated by their doubts over the actual participation the US will allow in space programs. Europe had looked forward to a role in the construction of the space shuttle, but is now limited to the development of research module payloads. While this portion of the post-Apollo program offers access to some of the technology the Europeans want, it may not be enough. The US decision earlier this year to renegotiate a cooperative agreement on building an aeronautical navigation satellite has also raised European doubts.

Under the leadership of several German aerospace industries, an attempt is being made to form a multi-national counterpart to NASA. This grouping of French, German, Belgian, Dutch, and possibly British industry would take over the management of European space programs. Although such an organization would require considerable time to gain cohesion, it could shift the balance toward Europa III and away from a European role in US post-Apollo plans.

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## COMMUNIST AID PROGRAMS CONTINUE

New Communist economic and military aid extended to less-developed countries during the first half of 1972 totaled \$680 million, considerably below the figure for the comparable period of last year. Of the total extended, \$620 million was for economic assistance. The rest was military assistance.

Chinese aid of over \$345 million represents more than half of the new aid and is equivalent to more than two thirds of China's commitments in 1971. Peking is continuing its recent practice of offering aid with less regard to the location or political orientation of recipients. African nations, which had received the overwhelming share of Chinese aid in 1970 and 1971, received less than one quarter of the total in the first half of 1972. Latin America received a full quarter, and the share for Near Eastern and South Asian countries rose to almost 40 percent. China became the first Communist economic aid donor to Burundi, Guyana, Malta, and Rwanda.

Eastern European countries extended some \$265 million of aid, most of it to five African nations. Romania and Czechoslovakia provided the major portion while Bulgaria and Hungary provided smaller amounts. The USSR, which has been the largest Communist donor in most years, provided only \$10 million, all to Bangladesh for relief and commodity assistance. Moscow also released to Bangladesh \$42 million of credits previously extended under agreements with Pakistan.

Some \$55 million of the roughly \$60 million of known Communist military aid commitments during the six-month period was extended by China, and almost all went to Pakistan. These figures overstate China's position as a military aid donor, however, as Soviet military commitments to Egypt, Syria, India and the Congo probably are considerably larger. Agreements are known to have been concluded with those states in 1972, but their value is not known.

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
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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Colombia: Politics in a New Key*

**Secret**

**Nº 48**

11 August 1972  
No. 0382/72A

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## Popular Conservatives



ANAPO



## Dissident Liberals



## Dissident Conservatives

**“TOLUQUEÑO” NUMERO 1 DE 1959**  
(septiembre 15)  
“Revista de la Constitución Nacional” (alternación  
de los partidos en el Poder).  
El Congreso de Colombia  
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Artículo 1. En los tres (3) periodos constitucionales comprendidos entre el siete (7) de agosto de mil novecientos sesenta y dos (1962) y el siete (7) de agosto de mil novecientos setenta y cuatro (1974), el Presidente de la Republica sera desempeñado alternativamente, por ciudadanos que pertenecen a los dos partidos tradicionales, el conservador y el liberal, de tal manera, que el Presidente que sea para uno cualquiera de dichos periodos pertenezca al partido distinto del de su inmediato predecesor. Por consiguiente, para iniciar la altermnación de este articulo, el cargo de Presidente de la Republica en el periodo comprendido entre el siete (7) de agosto de mil novecientos sesenta y dos (1962) y el siete (7) de agosto de mil novecientos sesenta y cuatro (1974) sera desempeñado por un ciudadano que pertenezca al partido liberal.

La elección de Presidente de la Republica que se realiza en el mes de agosto de mil novecientos sesenta y seis (1966) sera desempeñada por un ciudadano que pertenezca al partido constitucional comunista.

Artículo 2. La persona que de conformidad con los artículos 125 de la Constitución reelected en caso de falta de este, sera...

# COLOMBIA:

# POLITICS

**in a**

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## KEY

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Genuine political contention is returning to Colombia after a 14-year hiatus. For the first time since the artificial National Front system of parity in elective and appointive offices was contrived in 1957, the Liberal and Conservative parties are competing freely for the electorate's favor. In addition, other parties are permitted to appear on official ballots.

The end of the president's term of office in 1974 coincides with the end of the National Front on the national level. The phasing out of the front began in April 1970 on the local and departmental levels with open contests for assemblymen in all 22 departments and councilmen in 922 municipalities. The local and departmental elections of April 1972, coming midway through the last presidential term of the National Front, gave some foretaste of the presidential election in 1974.

The Liberal and Conservative parties are both split, opening the way for minor parties to play a role. The largest of the minor parties, former dictator Gustavo Rojas' National Popular Alliance, is jockeying to overcome its poor showing in April. It may play a pivotal role in the presidential contest.

### The National Front

Historically, Colombians have taken their politics seriously, even personally, and the mountainous nature of the country has emphasized regional political rivalries. Bitter animosity between the Liberal and Conservative parties since the mid-19th century fostered a heritage of violence in which physical assault and assassination became established political tactics. The dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla between 1953 and 1957 attempted to put an end to such violence, as did the National Front that followed.

The National Front formula was devised in 1957 by leaders of the two major parties. They feared that a return to unguided political activity after five years of monolithic rule by Rojas would mean a return to violence. Moreover, they viewed the tendency of such violence to degenerate into banditry, terrorism, and guerrilla activity as a threat to the existence of political parties. Consequently, they contrived a system that provided, by constitutional amendment, a "cooling off" period of 12 years (1958-1970) during which Liberals and Conservatives were to have absolute parity in elective and appointive offices throughout the country. This was later extended to 1974. The arrangement, aside from eliminating the internecine warfare between the two parties, precluded any return to the radical populism of Rojas.

During the National Front period the presidency has been alternated between the two parties. Each president has appointed six Liberals and six Conservatives to a 13-man Cabinet, with the thirteenth position—the defense portfolio—being filled by a nominally apolitical military officer. All executive agencies have been staffed by Liberals and Conservatives equally. If necessary, new positions have been created and filled in

#### Presidents Under the National Front

1958-1962	Alberto Lleras Camargo (Liberal)
1962-1966	Guillermo Leon Valencia (Conservative)
1966-1970	Carlos Lleras Restrepo (Liberal)
1970-1974	Misael Pastrana Borrero (Conservative)

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<b>CONGRESS (1970-74)</b>		
	<b>Senate (118 members)</b>	<b>House (210 members)</b>
Liberals	53	81
ANAPO	6	24
Total	59	105
Conservatives	33	63
ANAPO	26	42
Total	59	105

order to achieve parity. Each death, resignation, or retirement has necessitated a rebalancing of personnel.

On official ballots, half of the seats in each legislative body have been contested by Liberal candidates and the other half by Conservatives. This quest for parity has led to extraordinary artificiality in some rural constituencies that had a history of voting overwhelmingly for one or the other party. It has also obliged candidates who would not otherwise have identified themselves with one of the two major parties to do so to achieve elective office at all.

This was the situation facing Rojas' National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) before the elections in April 1970. Its candidates had to run under the banner of one or the other of the two official parties. For example, the Congress elected in 1970 has a number of ANAPO adherents calling themselves either Liberals or Conservatives.

Thus, the constitutional demand for parity has been assiduously observed while the spirit of the law has been gently abused. In Congress, ANAPO is a third party in all but name and will remain so until 1974. In departmental and local governments where parity officially ended in April 1970, ANAPO is now a fully functional third party.

#### **The April Elections**

The local and departmental elections last April, coming midway through the final presi-

dential term of the National Front, were regarded as a preview of the 1974 general election. ANAPO was free to compete and the various Liberal and Conservative factions were at liberty to consider alignments among themselves, as they surely will two years from now.

In the 1970 general elections, former dictator Rojas, running as a Conservative, came within 60,000 votes of winning the presidency. He did this by preaching his persuasive populism to voters who had grown apathetic in more than a decade of essentially non-competitive politics. Riding his coattails, ANAPO gained control of 16 of the 22 departmental assemblies and about two thirds of the municipal councils. As the 1972 elections approached, the Liberals and Conservatives reasoned that a strong ANAPO showing would call for some kind of Liberal-Conservative cooperation in order to defeat the common enemy in 1974. There were even suggestions that a serious ANAPO threat could be effectively met by extending the National Front through 1978.

But ANAPO did poorly in the 1972 elections—worse, in fact, than the orthodox politicians had dared to hope. Voter participation was low, as it always is in mid-term elections. ANAPO received only 18.7 percent of the vote. It emerged from the slow and cautious tally without a controlling faction in a departmental assembly and in



**Former Dictator  
Gustavo Rojas**

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**COLOMBIA**

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fewer than 5 percent of the nation's municipalities. The defeat elated the Liberals and Conservatives, and all but ended the talk of extending the National Front.

At the same time, the Liberals bested the Conservatives by a margin of 3-to-2. The various Liberal factions got 46.3 percent of the vote, while the more unified Conservatives chalked up 30.7 percent. Minor parties and voided ballots accounted for the remaining 4.3 percent of the vote.

The political mood of the country has been changed by the April elections. Liberal and Conservative leaders no longer consider ANAPO an overriding factor for 1974 and are proceeding toward the demise of the National Front in an orderly fashion. They anticipate that the politics that will arise from its ashes will be orthodox. The Liberals are confident that on the wings of their victory they can achieve the party unity essential to winning the presidency. The Conservatives, less divided than the Liberals, are equally confident. The Colombian political establishment is euphoric about simultaneously ushering out the National Front and ANAPO.

The euphoria cannot last. By 1974, the relative positions of the Liberals, Conservatives, and ANAPO are sure to undergo significant changes. Until April, former dictator Rojas, riding the crest of the ANAPO victories of 1970 and painfully aware of his advancing years (he will be 74 in 1974), was prepared to run his astute daughter, Senator Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, for the presidency. Her own political experience, backed by what was then thought to be the broad grassroots appeal of her father, could have made her, ANAPO planners thought, a major challenger. This would have been particularly true if one or more factions of the Liberal or Conservative parties could have been induced to support her, as probably would have been the case had she been able to run from a position of strength. Now, desperate to recapture its lost support, ANAPO might well nominate Rojas himself. His candidacy could recapture some supporters who defected in April, but it could also repel many voters at-

tracted to his programs but not his age. The elation of the front-running Liberals is already being tempered by the lack of movement toward party unification and the knowledge that none of their factions individually is as strong as the much more united Conservative Party.

### Party Alignments

**LIBERAL PARTY**—The party is profoundly divided. It had managed a surface unity during its most recent turn in the presidency (1966-70). With Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a member of what was to become the party's dissident wing, in the president's office, the official Liberals had no option other than unity. By 1971, however, when their term had ended and the Liberals had no prospect of another under the National Front, the internal division reached serious proportions.

### MAJOR PARTY RETURNS IN APRIL 1972 ELECTION

Departments and Territories	Liberals	Conservatives	ANAPO
Antioquia	119,020	117,002	70,426
Arauca	4,580	839	165
Atlantico	81,823	52,660	30,965
Bolivar	68,662	45,913	8,746
Boyaca	60,158	47,668	38,992
Caldas	30,610	42,217	16,917
Caqueta	7,344	3,997	3,373
Cauca	51,916	26,251	11,485
Cesar	22,041	15,918	9,493
Choco	27,086	6,607	1,662
Cordoba	66,654	39,797	15,642
Cundinamarca	221,853	101,829	83,577
Huila	29,902	29,506	12,871
La Guajira	13,801	15,496	6,675
Magdalena	51,953	30,590	7,447
Meta	9,583	7,639	5,561
Narino	56,449	43,833	16,470
Norte de Santander	38,283	44,098	33,142
Putumayo	5,275	4,316	1,672
Quindio	26,775	11,637	7,917
Risaralda	32,347	18,575	13,809
San Andres	3,014	1,820	354
Santander	80,863	61,077	47,367
Sucre	42,830	25,301	4,064
Tollima	75,605	34,607	19,720
Valle	155,281	88,516	91,309
Total	1,383,708	917,699	559,821

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In general, the dissident Liberals, led by Lleras Restrepo and Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, are the party's progressives and radicals. They extol the reform program of the Lleras Restrepo administration as a model for the future. They concentrate on regional and local action, principally because the official wing controls the national party organization. Lleras Restrepo himself cultivated a statesmanlike image prior to the April elections and did not campaign actively until the days just preceding the election. Lopez Michelsen,

on the other hand, was as vitriolic in attacking the official Liberals as he was in attacking the Conservatives and ANAPO. Since the election, Lleras Restrepo has descended from his pedestal somewhat and has engaged in a bitter public battle with his cousin, Alberto Lleras Camargo, the principal architect of the National Front, the first president under the front, and the elder statesman of the official Liberals.

Lleras Camargo is, in fact, no longer an active politician. His participation in Liberal politics is generally as an adviser. The main active figure among the official Liberals is Julio Cesar Turbay, whom Lleras Camargo supports as much as he supports anyone. Turbay considers his group the only legitimate Liberal organization, and indeed it is the larger of the two and the better organized. The strength of the official Liberals lies in the political machine—dominated by *caudillos* or “bosses”—at the departmental and local levels. One important factor in the defeat of ANAPO in April was the attention paid by the local machines to the middle-class vote, much of which had gone to ANAPO in 1970. As a rule, Turbay and his official Liberals lean to the right and, in fact, have supported the Conservative administration of President Pastrana. With the mid-term elections over, the real issue within the Liberal Party is whether the split can be bridged by 1974 or, failing that, which faction will become the stronger.

One proposal has been advanced that may provide a moderately satisfactory resolution of the Liberals' internal conflict. Spurred on by Lleras Restrepo, Liberals representing six departments where the official and dissident factions did not run separate lists in April are seeking a formula for party unification. Calling themselves a “pre-convention,” these Liberals have decided to poll Liberal councilmen in all municipalities to determine what type of party leadership and organization they favor. Each councilman's vote is to be weighted in accordance with the number of votes that elected him. This would favor the dissident Liberals because of their strength in the cities. Needless to say, Turbay and official Liberal spokesmen have come out against this proposal.

### PARTY LEADERS

#### Official Liberals

Julio Cesar Turbay  
Alberto Lleras Camargo

#### Dissident Liberals

Carlos Lleras Restrepo  
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen

#### Official Conservatives

Mariano Ospina Perez  
Alvaro Gomez Hurtado  
Miguel Pastrana Borrero

#### Dissident Conservatives

J. Emilio Valderrama  
Hernan Jaramillo Ocampo

#### Popular Conservatives

Belisario Betancur

#### ANAPO

Gustavo Rojas Pinilla  
Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno

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**Carlos Lleras Restrepo and his wife, April 1972**

Liberals of both factions agree that the dissidents would receive about 65 percent of the vote in such a poll. If the scheme goes through, the dissidents would control the party's nominating convention and would be likely to name Lleras Restrepo. In that event, the official faction would either be trapped into some semblance of party unity or be driven to hold its own convention and nominate its own candidate. Since competition between two Liberals in 1974 would go a long way toward electing a Conservative president, the proposed poll may be carried out and could set the stage for a semblance of reunification.

**CONSERVATIVE PARTY**—The Conservatives have three factions, but their differences are much less deep than those that split the Liberals. The overwhelming majority of the party is in the official group led by Alvaro Gomez Hurtado and elder statesman Mariano Ospina Perez. President Misael Pastrana is nominally a member of this faction. A so-called popular faction, now largely in decline, supported the candidacy of Belisario Betancur against that of Pastrana in 1970. A small dissident group, led by J. Emilio Valderrama and Hernan Jaramillo Ocampo, is gaining in importance and could supply a compromise candidate for 1974. The dissidents' strength is centered in Antioquia Department, normally a major source

of leadership and financing for the Conservative Party as a whole.

Alvaro Gomez of the official group has already announced his candidacy for the presidency in 1974, but this does not mean the Conservatives are speeding toward party unity. Although Gomez' leadership is grudgingly acknowledged by his faction and by the bulk of the party, he is not seen as an attractive presidential candidate. The widely respected Ospina can make or break party unity, and he is withholding judgment. He has suggested that the unraveling of the party could be minimized by extending the National Front to one more pair of Liberal-Conservative presidential terms.

The dissident Conservatives, in effect challenging the leadership of both Gomez and Ospina, have announced the tentative candidacy of Jaramillo. The reformist position taken by Jaramillo makes him popular with Conservatives in the cities and his association with agriculture pleases Conservatives in rural areas. But a Conservative Party united under Jaramillo competing openly with a Liberal Party under Lleras Restrepo would offer the voters little choice, as the two have similar views. The candidacy of Jaramillo may be no more than a tentative effort to gauge the dissident Liberal's views regarding a coalition. A united Conservative Party in combination with roughly half of the Liberal Party would be immensely powerful. If it could remain intact, it could prove unbeatable in 1974.

**ANAPO**—Leadership rests wholly with Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and his daughter, Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno. There are no internal factions. A variety of often mutually conflicting currents constitute what passes for a party policy. In essence, ANAPO is a populist vehicle for the lower and lower-middle classes, those Colombians least attended to by the traditional parties. The second-level leadership of ANAPO has been made up of unsuccessful Liberal and Conservative politicians who rallied to Rojas—particularly when he almost won the presidency in 1970—in hope of tasting power.

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The crushing defeat suffered by ANAPO in April has led to significant changes within the party. The most obvious change is that Rojas probably cannot again come within 60,000 votes of being president. As a corollary, some doubt is cast on the value to the party of his daughter. Statistics from the April election indicate that the Liberals who took temporary refuge in ANAPO have now left it. Some of Rojas' advisers are recommending that he personally select and support a Liberal candidate. This would attract back some or all of the Liberals who defected in April and would add to the Liberal Party's unification problems. ANAPO has made tentative moves in this direction by forming a coalition with the dissident Liberals in several municipal councils. Others of Rojas' advisers recommend that he himself run for president, rather than the more energetic Maria Eugenia. It may be that the personal appeal of the old dictator himself is all that can revitalize the party by 1974.

When Rojas nearly won the 1970 presidential election, he was one of four Conservative candidates running under the National Front system; there was no Liberal candidate. Many of his votes came from Liberals. In 1974 there will be at least one candidate from each major party; so there is likely to be little protest voting for an ANAPO candidate. Since, however, the Liberals will have trouble fixing on a single candidate and since the Conservatives will probably try to form a coalition with the dissident Liberals, ANAPO's role in the 1974 election could still be pivotal.

#### Prospect

The dust from the mid-term elections has settled. ANAPO is much less a political factor



Maria Rojas de Moreno ejected from Congress.

among the electorate than had been feared. This does not imply that its role in the next campaign and election will be insignificant. The next president of Colombia is not very likely to come from ANAPO but, if election coalitions become necessary, he may owe the party some debt. Moreover, simultaneous with the presidential election will be elections for the National Congress. A congressional standoff between Liberals and Conservatives could make it possible for ANAPO to hold the key to legislative action, as for all practical purposes it does now. In addition, should no candidate emerge with a clear majority, a runoff in the incumbent Congress would be necessary, and ANAPO's participation in the selection of a president would be greater still.

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